Executive Pardon of Direct Contempt of Court by Hall, James Parker
University of Chicago Law School
Chicago Unbound
Journal Articles Faculty Scholarship
1926
Executive Pardon of Direct Contempt of Court
James Parker Hall
Follow this and additional works at: https://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/journal_articles
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at Chicago Unbound. It has been accepted for inclusion in Journal
Articles by an authorized administrator of Chicago Unbound. For more information, please contact unbound@law.uchicago.edu.
Recommended Citation
James Parker Hall, Comment, "Executive Pardon of Direct Contempt of Court," 21 Illinois Law Review 379 (1926).
COMMENT ON RECENT CASES
Beatrice Creamery Company v. Cline' reads: "Colorado Anti-trust
Act, prohibiting all combinations to fix prices of commodities or to
otherwise restrict trade or commerce, held violative of Const. U. S.
Amend. 14, in view of Colorado Co-operative Marketing Act, exempt-
ing nonprofit agricultural associations marketing agricultural prod-
ucts from its application."
This doctrine is novel and somewhat startling, and we are in-
clined to think that the judicial Jupiter must have nodded. It is
that a comprehensive anti-trust or other regulatory statute will be
rendered unconstitutional if an attempt is afterwards made to auth-
orize a combination in restraint of trade in some particular commod-
ity or in some branch of trade which otherwise would" have been
prohibited by the general act, and even though the second act does
not in terms amend or re-enact the prior statute but merely states
that such statute shall not be applicable to it. By analogy a statute
which provides that all high school graduates shall have -the privi-
lege of attending the state university will become unconstitutional
if it is afterwards followed by an independent but obviously uncon-
stitutional enactment that red-headed persons shall be denied the
privilege.
Unless the Supreme Court of the United States shall disaffirm
its prior holdings and come to recognize a valid distinction between
a combination of primary producers and a combination of manufac-
turers or middlemen, which perhaps it may do at no distant date,
we have no doubt of the invalidity of the second Colorado statute.2
We are not able to believe, however, that the invalidity of this sec-
ond and independent act would or should affect the prior enact-
ment.
Each act, we believe, should be allowed to stand upon its own
foundations. The latter should be declared void but the former
should be left untainted. Otherwise we must keep our legislators
under lock and key, lest in their desire to enact new legislation and
to meet the needs of to-day, they may unwittingly render invalid all
of the legislation of the past and all that our ancestors have done
for us.
ANDREW A. BRUCE.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-SEPARATION1" OF POWERS-PARDo BY
GOVERNOR OF DIRECT CONTEMPT OF CoIiRT.-[New Mexico] The
doctrine laid down by Chief Justice Taft in the Grossnan case last
year has just been carried to its logical extreme by the New Mexico
Supreme Court, holding that the governor may pardon a defendant
committed to jail by a judge for direct contempt effected by words
uttered in court and addressed directly to the judge while on the
bench.2 What was actually said by the defendant and the judge is
1. 9 Fed. (2d) 176.
2. Connolly v. Union Sewer Pipe Co. 184 U. S. 540.
1. (1925) 267 U. S. 87.
2. Ex parte, Magee (1925 N. Mex.) 242 Pac. 332.
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not repeated in the opinion of the court, but the curious may find
what purports to be verbatim account of the episode in the New Re-
public for August 20, 1924, page 353ff. The court refers to the
local situation in the following language:
"It is said in the briefs that no case is to be found in the books
wherein it has been decided that a direct contempt may be pardoned.
From this fact it is sought to be argued that the power does not exist
in such cases. We deem the argument faulty. In the first place, that
no such case is to be found may be accounted for by the fact that no
such circumstances have heretofore existed, either in the mental atti-
tude of the Governor or the judge concerned in such a transaction."
The court adopts in toto the reasoning of Chief Justice Taft in
the Grossman case, which is indeed so persuasive that it is likely to
command general assent in all subsequent cases of like tenor arising
in the United States.3
JAMES PARKER HALL.
CONTITuIoNAI LAw-STATE HIGHwAYS-AUTOMOBILES-
RIGHT OF STATE TO REGULATE USE OF HIGHWAYS BY PRIVATE
CARRIERS FOR HIRE.- [United States] The case of Frost et al. v.
Railroad Commission of State of California' is an example of the
tendency of the Supreme Court of the United States, especially
apparent since the appointment of Justices Sutherland and Butler,
more and more to extend the scope of federal governmental control
and to use the fourteenth amendment and the interstate commerce
clause of the Constitution as a means for centralizing business con-
trol under a federal judicial rule of reason. It evidences a policy
against which a minority of the court has frequently protested,
and concerning which Mr. Justice Holmes once said:
"There is nothing that I more deprecate than the use of the four-
teenth amendment beyond the absolute compulsion of its words to pre-
vent the making of social experiments that an important part of the
community desires in the insulated chambers .afforded by the several
States, even though the experiments may seem futile or even noxious
to me and to those whose judgment I most respect. The fourteenth
amendment, itself a historical product, did not destroy history for the
States and substitute mechanical compartments of law all exactly alike."
In the case under consideration the Supreme Court of the
United States holds invalid a statute of the state of California
which requires intrastate private carriers for hire who carry on
their business by the use of automobiles upon the public highways
to obtain a certificate of necessity and public convenience from
the state railway commission and to submit to the regulations of
that commission both as to the conduct of their business and the
amount of their fees and charges. All of the members of the court
seem to concede that, if it were limited to common carriers only,
3. See comments upon the Grossman; case in (1924) ILL. LAW REv.
XIX:176; (1925) ID. XX:165.
1. 46 Sup. Ct. Rep. 604.
